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Note
BERING V. SHARE: ACCOMMODATING
ABORTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1973 THE United States Supreme Court held that Texas
statutes criminalizing abortion violated the constitutional right of
privacy' and were therefore void. The controversial Roe v. Wade2
decision, which permitted elective abortions during the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy, sparked a major anti-abortion movement in the
United States.3 Before Roe, abortion was not uncommon; most
states permitted abortion if the woman's life was in danger, and sev-
eral states permitted "non-therapeutic" (that is, elective) abortions.4
1. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court found this right of pri-
vacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and held that a state law forbidding the use of
contraceptives was unconstitutional. Id. at 483, 485.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court recognized separate and distinct state interests in
protecting the life and health of the pregnant woman and in protecting the potentiality of
human life. Id. at 162. Accordingly, the Court established guidelines for regulation of the
abortion procedure which allow very little regulatiorr of abortion in the first trimester of
pregnancy, but permit greater state regulation and even proscription of abortion in the third
trimester of pregnancy. During the first trimester the abortion decision is left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's physician; during the second trimester the state may regu-
late the abortion procedure in ways "reasonably related to maternal health"; in the third
trimester the interest of the state in protecting potential life becomes compelling, and the state
may regulate and even proscribe abortion unless necessary for the preservation of the preg-
nant woman's life or health. Id. at 163-64.
3. In a study of the anti-abortion movement in California, sociologist Kristin Luker
argues that, although the anti-abortion movement had experienced "slow but steady" growth
between 1967 (the year California reformed its abortion law) and 1973, the Roe v. Wade
decision was the major catalyst for most anti-abortion activists. She reports that, of those
interviewed, more joined the anti-abortion movement in 1973 than in any year before or
since. K. LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 137 (1984). Luker further
discusses in detail the mobilization of anti-abortion forces and the response to Roe v. Wade.
Id. at 133-46. See also P. CONOVER & V. GRAY, FEMINISM & THE NEW RIGHT: CONFLICT
OVER THE AMERICAN FAMILY 6 (1983) (Roe spurred organization of anti-abortion groups
and programs).
4. In 1972, twenty-five states permitted abortion when necessary to save the woman's
life; in addition, five states permitted abortion when necessary to save the life of the mother or
child (apparently construing any induced birth as abortion). Alabama and the District of
Columbia permitted abortion when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Eleven states had adopted some version of the Model Penal Code abortion statute, which
made abortion illegal except when the physician believed it was necessary to preserve the
physical or mental health of the mother, the child would have grave mental or physical de-
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Nevertheless, the Roe decision shocked many Americans who had
been unaware of both the increasing public acceptance of abortion
and of the very large number of abortions, both legal and illegal,
which occurred annually.5
Following the Roe decision, abortion opponents formed hun-
dreds of anti-abortion organizations, both formal and informal.
Through these groups abortion opponents have tried to circumvent
and reverse the Roe v. Wade decision. Anti-abortion activists have
proposed both legislation6 and constitutional amendments7 which
would prohibit abortion and have supported Supreme Court nomi-
nees who have expressed opposition to Roe v. Wade. They have
also attempted to stop abortion through "direct action" strategies
such as picketing, harassment, and violence.8
This Note will discuss the success of the "direct action" strate-
gies of anti-abortion activists and the constitutional issues which
these strategies raise. Lawful protest activities of anti-abortion
groups are seemingly protected by the first amendment, which pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech."9 Despite this protection, some conduct and speech of
the anti-abortion protestors may, need to be restricted in order to
enable women to exercise their constitutionally protected right to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. Although Roe and subse-
quent abortion opinions by the Supreme Court only insulate the
fects, or the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. Four states
had very liberalized abortion laws and allowed abortion with very few restrictions besides
residency and timing (eg., non-viability). Four states prohibited all abortions, but courts in
two of those states had interpreted the statutes to permit abortion when necessary to save the
mother's life. One state had no abortion law at all, and one state allowed abortion when
necessary to save the woman's life or the pregnancy resulted from rape. Comment, A Survey
of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177, 179-80, nn.25-30. See also K. LUKER, supra note 3, at 272, n.3 (by
1973 nearly one-third of the states had liberalized their abortion laws).
5. K. LUKER, supra note 3, at 137-41. Luker argues that the Supreme Court Justices
who decided Roe believed, and were justified in believing, that the abortion reform movement
was a national one which "commanded widespread public support." Id. at 142. At that
time, in contrast, the anti-abortion movement appeared to be a "small, isolated group, ideo-
logically suspect because of the predominantly religious nature of its beliefs." Id
6. See infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
7. See infra text accompanying note 13.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 17-32.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The prohibition has been interpreted to apply to state gov-
ernments through the 14th amendment as well. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937) (the due process clause of the 14th amendment of the federal constitution safeguards
the freedoms of speech and press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of
speech and of press are personal rights and liberties protected by the 14th amendment from
impairment by the states).
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abortion decision from undue governmental interference,1" women
may have a constitutionally protected interest in making this deci-
sion free from private interference as well.
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed this appar-
ent conflict between the free speech rights of anti-abortion protes-
tors and the interest of a woman in making the abortion decision
free from harassment in Bering v. SHARE." Bering restricted the
location of anti-abortion protestors picketing a medical facility
where abortions are performed and prohibited their use of particu-
lar words while at the picket site.2
II. THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT
A. Strategies of Anti-Abortion Protestors
Until recently, anti-abortion organizations concentrated most of
their efforts on the political system. These groups have proposed
constitutional amendments which would give Congress and the
states the power to prohibit abortion, 3 and have proposed legisla-
tion which would withdraw abortion-related cases from the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts.' 4 They have also proposed legislation which
would declare that human life exists from conception and would
extend fourteenth amendment protections to fetuses."i None of
these proposals has succeeded. The anti-abortion movement has,
however, been more successful in passing legislation restricting pub-
lic funding for abortion and imposing various regulations on the
performance of abortions. 6
10. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
11. 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., The Proposed Human Life Federalism Amendment, S.J. Res. 110, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), which would amend the Constitution as follows: "A right to abortion
is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the several States shall have concur-
rent power to restrict and prohibit abortion: Provided, That a provision of a law of a State
which is more restrictive than a conflicting provision of a law of Congress shall govern."
14. See, e.g., The Proposed Human Life Bill, S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.
900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). These jurisdictional proposals, are, however, subject to
constitutional attack. See generally Constitutional Restraints Upon the Judiciary: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (hearing included "Re-
port on the constitutionality of H.R. 4273" to withdraw abortion-related cases from federal
courts' jurisdiction).
15. See The Proposed Human Life Bill, S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 900,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This proposed statute would also establish state court jurisdic-
tion over abortion-related cases.
16. A federal statute known as the Hyde Amendment prohibits the use of federal funds
for abortion except when the mother's life is endangered or the pregnancy resulted from rape,
but allows the use of such funds for childbirth. Pub. L. No. 86-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926
[Vol. 38:698
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In the last several years, the focus of the abortion debate has
shifted from the legislature to the community at large as the anti-
abortion movement has increasingly directed its message toward
abortion clinics, doctors, individual women, landowners, and insur-
ers. 7 Pickets, sit-ins, and sidewalk "counseling" at abortion clinics
are increasingly common tactics.18 As the number and frequency of
abortion clinic protests has increased, 19 the character of the protests
has changed. Abortion clinic administrators report that, in contrast
to the protests of the 1970s, when anti-abortion activists marched
silently, carrying signs and roses, protests of the 1980s are ex-
tremely vocal and increasingly confrontational.2" Protestors shout
at patients, urging them not to "murder" their "babies."'" They
bang on, peer through, and shout through clinic windows.22 Clinic
(1980). See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (upholding the 1980 version of the
Hyde Amendment).
States have also limited the use of federal funds for abortion. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld a state regulation granting Medicaid benefits for child-
birth but denying them for nontherapeutic abortions. Id at 474.
As of 1985, 30 states limited abortion funding by allowing public funds to support abor-
tion only where the woman's life was in danger; 14 states as well as the District of Columbia
paid for all abortions (of these, five states paid for abortion only because of a state court
order); six states paid for abortion only in cases of rape, incest, endangerment of the mother's
life, and in some cases, where there was a fetal abnormality. Sollomon & Donovan, State
Laws and the Provision of Family Planning and Abortion Services in 1985, 17 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 262, 263 (1985).
The Supreme Court has limited the kinds of regulations which may be imposed on the
performance of abortion..See, eg., Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (per curiam)
(affirming decision invalidating a statute requiring unemancipated pregnant minors to wait 24
hours after notifying both parents of decision to obtain an abortion); Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating statute re-
quiring informed consent similar to that in Akron, detailed record keeping, use of the
abortion technique most protective of the fetus in post-viability abortions unless medical risks
to mother were significantly higher, and second physician for post-viability abortions); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating require-
ment that all second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, an informed consent
requirement overstating possible physical and psychological consequences of abortion, a re-
quirement that only a doctor could inform the woman of the risks of abortion, and a required
24-hour waiting period).
17. America's Abortion Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 20, 23-24.
18. See Donovan, The Holy War, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 5, 6 (1985); Monaghan, Side-
walk Cou seling: A First Amendment Right, 31 CATH. LAW. 50, 50 (1987).
19. [etween 1977 and 1981, only 24 abortion clinics reported to the National Abortion
Federation (NAF) that they had been the object of protests. In 1986, in contrast, 141 clinics
reported protests to NAF. These are conservative numbers since most protests are not re-
ported to the NAF. National Abortion Federation, Incidents of Reported Violence Toward
Abortion Providers (1986) [hereinafter NAF, stats. I].
20. America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 17, at 23.
21. Id.
22. See Donovan, supra note 18, at 6; America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 17, at 23.
One famous anti-abortion movement leader, Joseph Scheidler, was cited for contempt in the
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patients, staff, and doctors not only are harassed at clinics, but also,
in some cases, are subjected to picketing and harassing phone calls
at their homes.23 Some doctors who perform abortions report that
anti-abortion activists have threatened members of their families.24
Activists have urged hospitals not to employ doctors who perform
abortions, and have urged landlords not to renew abortion clinic
leases.2 Anti-abortion activists have increasingly trespassed
against and invaded clinics, blocked clinic entrances and exits, and
physically obstructed clinic patients and staff.26 Even more alarm-
ing is the fact that abortion clinics have been the targets of arson
and bombings.27 In the period from January 1982 to December
1986, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms investigated
thirty incidents of arson and nineteen incidents of bombings at
abortion clinics, which had caused damage in excess of five million
dollars.2"
Anti-abortion activists have also sponsored the recent prolifera-
tion of pregnancy counseling clinics, whose sole object is to per-
suade women to continue unwanted pregnancies. These clinics,
which offer free pregnancy tests, advertise in phone books and
newspapers in a manner calculated to attract women with un-
wanted pregnancies. Called "Problem Pregnancy" or "Pregnancy
Distress," many of these clinics not only use logos similar or nearly
identical to those of nearby abortion clinics, but also place them-
selves very near abortion clinics, preferably in the same building.
Women who enter these clinics are subjected to very strong anti-
abortion rhetoric, usually in the form of a graphic film and personal
persuasion. Critics of these clinics, which are estimated to number
Bering case. Brief of Amici Curiae, National Lawyer's Guild, at 6, Bering v. SHARE, 106
Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986). Scheidler is founder and director of the Pro-Life Action
League, and has authored a book called CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION, in which he
instructs anti-abortion activists in various tactics designed to disrupt clinics. He is well-
known for his use of the bullhorn at clinics, through which he exhorts women not to "kill
their babies." America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 17, at 25.
23. Donovan, supra note 18, at 5-6; America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 17, at 23.
24. Donovan, supra note 18, at 6.
25. See Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 229, 721 P.2d 918, 929 (1986), cert. dis-
missed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987); America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 17, at 23-24.
26. Donovan, supra note 18, at 6.
27. National Abortion Federation, Reported Incidents of Arson and Bombing, 1986
(1986) [hereinafter NAF, stats.II].
28. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Abortion Related Incidents Investigated
(Dec. 5, 1986) (available at Office of Public Affairs). The National Abortion Federation has
reported additional violent incidents not investigated by the BATF. NAF, stats.II, supra
note 27; NAF, stats.I, supra note 19; National Abortion Federation, Antiabortion Violence:
Incidents of Arsons, Bombings, and Attempts, 1977-86 (Jan. 1987).
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2,900, say that they provide "medical misinformation, brutally
graphic films, exaggerated statistics, and high-pressure anti-abor-
tion rhetoric."' 9 Individual women and some pro-choice organiza-
tions have sued the groups sponsoring these clinics for deceptive
advertising.3"
Anti-abortion and pro-choice activists agree that failures in the
political arena have led to increased use of "direct action" protest
tactics by anti-abortion activists.31 Some suggest that the large in-
flux of fundamentalist Christians into the anti-abortion movement
29. Pro-life 'Clinic' Tactics Criticized, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1986, at 3. Many of
the clinics are modeled on a manual published by Robert J. Pearson, founder of the Pearson
Foundation, called How TO START AND OPERATE YOUR OWN PRO-LIPE OUTREACH CRI-
SIS PREGNANCY CENTER. Id. For a description of this book see Manual Outlines Methods
on How to Deter Abortion, AM. MED. NEws, Feb. 14, 1985, at 65.
Some critics argue that the pregnancy counseling clinics might endanger the health of
pregnant women who need medical treatment because they do not have medically trained
staff who can recognize medical complications. See Pro-Life 'Clinic' Tactics Criticized, supra
note 29, at 67.
30. Private individuals and state governments have sued clinics in Fort Worth, Texas
and in California for deceptive advertising (California has laboratory licensure laws requiring
that certain criteria be met in order to qualify as a "clinic"), but the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) is apparently unwilling to take action against the clinics. Pro-life 'Clinic' Tactics
Criticized, supra note 29, at 66-67.
31. Donovan, supra note 18, at 8. For discussion of failed proposals at the national
level, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
At the state level, anti-abortion legislation has not fared well in very recent years. In
1986, voters defeated anti-abortion efforts in four states and three towns. In Massachusetts,
an amendment which would prohibit the use of state funds for abortion and which would
permit the legislature to ban abortion failed 58% to 42%. A Rhode Island proposal which
would have prohibited the use of state funds for abortion and which declared that life begins
at fertilization failed 65% to 35%. In Arkansas an amendment to the state constitution
which would prohibit the use of state funds for abortion, and which declared a policy of
protecting life from conception, was defeated by a narrow margin. An Oregon amendment
prohibiting the use of state funds was defeated 54% to 46%. In three New England towns,
nonbinding referenda which asked whether Roe v. Wade should be overturned were also
defeated. National Abortion Federation, Public Support for Abortion, FACT SHEET (Dec.
1986) [hereinafter NAF, FACT SHEET]; Donovan, Letting the People Decide: How the An-
tiabortion Referenda Fared, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 127 (1986).
In 1985, 65 laws relating to fertility were passed in 49 states, but none of them imposed
restrictions on abortion of the type struck down by the Court in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Several states enacted laws imposing
severe penalties for illegal acts against abortion clinics, and several states passed nonbinding
resolutions condemning violence and harassment directed against abortion providers. See,
eg., Washington state's Anti-Harrassment Act of 1985, Washington Senate Bill 3012, May
13, 1985; Massachusetts statute increasing maximum sentence for illegal use of bombs; Wis-
consin criminalization of trespassing on abortion facility; Connecticut, Virginia, and Wash-
ington resolutions condemning violence against abortion facilities and urging law
enforcement officers to prosecute perpetrators of violence. Sollomon & Donovan, supra note
16, at 262.
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in recent years has also helped change its character.32 Whatever the
explanation for the change in tactics, there is no question that in
recent years the number of anti-abortion protests has increased dra-
matically, and that those protests have become increasingly aggres-
sive and frequently violent.
B. Impact of Anti-A bortion Protests
It is far from clear that anti-abortion activists have been more
successful in blocking abortion through protest than through polit-
ical pressure. Anti-abortion activists do not seem to have had a
very large impact on public opinion. While opinion poll results
vary greatly with the exact wording of the abortion question, recent
polls agree that a majority of Americans continue to favor legalized
abortion.3 3 Moreover, several polls suggest that support for legal-
ized abortion has actually increased slightly in recent years.34
The protestors themselves maintain that they have been very
successful in closing down abortion clinics. 35 Abortion clinic direc-
tors disagree. While there have been reports that abortion clinics
have been unable to get insurance and leases renewed as the result
of anti-abortion activity,36 these difficulties seem to stem more from
violent attacks on abortion clinics than from peaceful picketing.
There is no question that the aggressive nature of protests has been
very expensive for abortion clinics, both in terms of repairing dam-
age and in protecting against damage,37 but it does not appear that
32. Donovan, supra note 18, at 8.
33. NAF, FACT SHEET, supra note 31. One study found that question wording could
affect results as much as 10 to 15%. Jackson & Vinovskis, Public Opinion, Elections, and the
"Single-Issue" Issue, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 64 (G.
Steiner ed. 1983).
34. See, e.g., NAF, FACT SHEET, supra note 31; K. LUKER, supra note 3, at 216-17; P.
CONNOVER & V. GRAY, supra note 3, at 134; Jackson & Vinovskis, supra note 33, at 64-70.
Polls agree that most Americans support a middle ground on abortion. That is, few Ameri-
cans support legal abortion in all circumstances (22%, according to a 1985 Gallup poll), and
few Americans favor making abortion illegal in all circumstances (22%, according to the
same Gallup poll). According to 1985 polls conducted by ABC and the National Opinion
Research Center, support for legalized abortion is greatest (more than 80%) when the life or
health of the mother is threatened or when the pregnancy results from rape or incest. NAF,
FACT SHEET, supra note 31.
35. Scheidler, founder and director of the Pro-Life Action League, claims to have closed
18 abortion clinics. America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 17, at 25.
36. See Donovan, supra note 18, at 5.
37. Many clinics have hired guards, installed expensive security systems, and have
trained staff in anti-terrorism techniques. The Abortion-Clinic Bombings, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
3, 1984, at 31; Donovan, supra note 18, at 5. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
has published a pamphlet instructing clinics how to deal with anti-abortion protests, both
violent and non-violent. ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, PRESERVING THE
704 [Vol. 38:698
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anti-abortion activists have succeeded in significantly reducing the
number of abortion clinics.
Anti-abortion activists may be more successful, however, in con-
vincing individual women to continue their pregnancies. The pres-
ence of anti-abortion protestors at abortion clinics undoubtedly
makes abortion more distressing. Given the emotionally-charged
nature of the decision to have an abortion and the difficulty in
reaching a decision even under favorable conditions, the aggressive
and confrontational nature of these direct action tactics may dis-
courage some women, who otherwise would have elected an abor-
tion, from choosing one.38 The extent to which these anti-abortion
tactics have had this consequence, however, is not easily
documented.
In cases involving anti-abortion counseling clinics, legal reme-
dies for deceptive advertising are available in some states.39 Where
the protestors' behavior is violent or aggressive, or where protestors
trespass on the abortion clinic's property, the clinic clearly has legal
remedies. In at least thirteen states abortion clinics have obtained
injunctions against protestors who have blocked clinic entrances
and parking lots; threatened, harassed, intimidated, insulted, or
shoved patients and staff; trespassed against or invaded clinics;
peered into or shouted through clinic windows; shouted obscenities;
photographed patients; harassed patients and staff at home; used
voice amplification; and made disruptive phone calls or false ap-
pointments. 4° Courts have also limited the number of protestors
who may picket clinics at any one time, restricted the areas in whch
protestors may picket, and barred protesors from carrying signs
such as "baby-killer."41 This latter restriction has been held to in-
fringe unconstitutionally upon the free speech rights of protestors.42
Most of the prohibited conduct for which legal remedies are
available, such as arson, bombings, trespass and assault, does not
RIGHT TO CHOOSE: How TO COPE WITH VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION AT ABORTION CLIN-
'cs (1986).
38. The presence of noisy protestors outside abortion clinics may also result in a higher
rate of medical complications. See Dr. P. Stubblefield, Statement Before the House Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights (submitted Dec. 17, 1986). J.
SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION 74-76 (1985) advocates increasing the
abortion complication rate through disruptive protests as an effective way of stopping
abortion.
39. See supra note 30.
40. Donovan, supra note 18, at 7.
41. Id.
42. OBGYN Ass'n. v. Birthright of Brooklyn, 64 A.D. 2d 894, 896, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 903,
906 (1978).
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constitute protected speech. The remainder of this Note will discuss
restrictions on anti-abortion speech which directly raise first amend-
ment concerns. Specifically, this Note will address the question of
whether, within the confines of the first amendment, some speech
may be restricted in order to enable women to exercise freely their
constitutionally protected right to decide to terminate a pregnancy,
and to protect their interest in obtaining abortion free from
harassment.
III. ABORTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Introduction
Anti-abortion protestors who engage in peaceful picketing at
abortion clinics seem clearly to be exercising constitutionally pro-
tected rights of freedom of speech. If, however, the anti-abortion
protestors' conduct and speech infringes upon the ability of women
to exercise their privacy-based right to decide to terminate a preg-
nancy, perhaps, as at least one court has held,43 the first amendment
does not preclude restrictions on such speech.
The Supreme Court has held that the right of privacy includes
the right to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy, free
from governmental interference.' This right does not preclude all
private interference; the abortion funding cases clearly state that pri-
vate interference with the abortion decision is not a constitutional
violation requiring governmental correction.45
43. Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 226, 721 P.2d 918, 927 (1986), cert. dismissed,
107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
45. See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The Court upheld, 6-3, a state regula-
tion which grants Medicaid benefits for live births but denies them for non-therapeutic abor-
tions. The Court rejected the claim that the policy preference for live births over abortion
violated the equal protection clause by rejecting the argument that a governmental classifica-
tion which burdens indigent women is a suspect classification. Id. at 470-71. In response to
the claim that the regulation unconstitutionally infringed upon a fundamental right of pri-
vacy, the Court said that the lower court misconceived "the nature and scope of the funda-
mental right recognized in Roe" when it concluded that nothing less than a compelling state
interest would justify the disparate treatment. Id. at 471-72. Roe, said the Court, only "pro-
tects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy [and does not limit] the authority of a State to make a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds .... There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a pro-
tected activity and state encouragement of an alternative." Id. at 473-74, 475.
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) the Court upheld, 5-4, the Hyde Amendment, a
federal statute which prohibits states from using Medicaid funds for abortion unless the life of
the mother is endangered or it is a medically necessary procedure following rape or incest.
This statute differs from the one at issue in Maher in that "therapeutic" abortions, allowed by
[Vol. 38:698
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As long as the anti-abortion protestors are not creations of the
state or clothed with state action, the right of privacy does not com-
pel government to prevent them from interfering with a woman's
right to choose to terminate a pregnancy." Even if private interfer-
ence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, however,
there may still be a significant governmental interest in protecting
the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free from harassment.
Moreover, the case for government intervention will be made
stronger insofar as it regulates, but does not deny, the protestors'
speech. Whether this governmental interest is sufficiently impor-
tant to justify restrictions on the speech of anti-abortion protestors
is the question addressed by the Washington Supreme Court in Ber-
ing v. SHARE.47
B. Bering v. SHARE
In Bering v. SHARE, Chief Justice Pearson, writing for the ma-
jority, modified but upheld the permanent injunctions issued by the
Spokane Superior Court against SHARE anti-abortion picketers.48
SHARE members49 had been picketing a Spokane medical building
housing more than two dozen medical offices, only some of which
performed non-therapeutic abortions. Physicians in the building,
concerned about the impact of SHARE's sidewalk "counseling"
and picketing on the welfare of their patients, sought an injunction
to restrain SHARE members' picketing. The lower court, after is-
suing a temporary restraining order, issued a permanent injunction
following a full day show-cause hearing.50 The injunction prohib-
the Maher statute, require only a medical determination that the mother's health, as opposed
to life, require the abortion. In Harris the Court stated that, "although government may not
place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation." Id. at 316. The current U.S. Department of Justice believes
that the protest activities of anti-abortion activities do not require investigation by the federal
government. In response to letters from pro-choice organizations and clinics calling for an
investigation by the Civil Rights Division into harassment of abortion providers and abortion
seekers, the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division wrote:
Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, in virtually no case have the civil rights
statutes been violated by anti-abortion clinic activities. The Supreme Court has
held that the right to abortion is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. As
such it is protected against interference by the state or its officials. It is not a right
protected against private interference.
Letter from Stephen S. Trott to Lyn C. Gill, Cleveland Planned Parenthood (Aug. 28, 1985).
46. Id.
47. 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
48. Id.
49. SHARE is an informal, anti-abortion organization. Id. at 216, 721 P.2d at 918.
50. Id. at 216, 721 P.2d at 922-23.
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ited SHARE picketers from:
(1) picketing, demonstrating, or "counseling" at the Medical
Building, except along the public sidewalk north of the bus stop
on Stevens Avenue [this restriction effectively prevents picketers
from demonstrating on the sidewalk fronting the major
entrance]; 51
(2) threatening, assaulting, intimidating or coercing anyone en-
tering or leaving the Medical Building;
(3) interfering with ingress or egress at the building or parking
lots to the south or southeast on the premises;
(4) trespassing on the premises;
(5) engaging in any unlawful activity directed at respondent
physicians or their patients;
(6) referring, in oral statements while at the picket site, to phy-
sicians or patients, staff, or clients as "murdering" or "murder-
ers", "killing" or "killers"; or to children or babies as being
"killed" or "murdered" by anyone in the Medical Building.5 2
SHARE demonstrators appealed the trial court's first time,
place, and manner restriction, which prohibits picketers from de-
monstrating on the sidewalk fronting the medical facility's public
entrance.5 3 SHARE also appealed that part of the injunction, ana-
lyzed by the Washington Supreme Court as a content-based restric-
tion, which prohibits protestors from using the words "kill" or
"murder" and their derivatives at the medical facility. 4
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the place restriction,
but found the content-based restriction to be drawn more broadly
than was constitutionally permissible." The court agreed that there
was a compelling governmental interest in preventing children from
being subjected to the psychological trauma of hearing the words
"kill" and "murder" used in connection with their doctors just
prior to a medical visit. 6 The court decided, however, that the gov-
ernmental interest was compelling only when children were actually
present at the picket site and held that the words "kill," "murder,"
and their derivatives could be prohibited only when children of an
age likely to be adversely affected were present.5 7 The court then
remanded the case to the lower court to determine "the appropriate
age limit," noting respondent-physicians' suggestion that the re-
stricted words would have the most severe impact on children
51. Id. at 217, 721 P.2d at 922.
52. Id. at 219, 721 P.2d at 923-24.
53. Id. at 221, 721 P.2d at 924.
54. Id. at 234, 721 P.2d at 932.
55. Id. at 234, 721 P.2d at 931, 935.
56. Id. at 245, 721 P.2d at 937.
57. Id. at 242, 245-46, 721 P.2d at 936-37.
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under the age of twelve.58
1. The Content-Neutral/Content-Based Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis
The constitutional guarantee of free speech has never been inter-
preted to be absolute.5 9 The Supreme Court has stated that "the
First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate
one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be
desired"6 and has separated restrictions on speech into two catego-
ries: content-neutral and content-based restrictions.61 This distinc-
tion is central to most first amendment analysis because content-
neutral restrictions on speech are subjected to a lower standard of
review than are content-based restrictions.62
Content-based speech restrictions are considered more offensive
to the values underlying the first amendment than are content-neu-
tral time, place, and manner restrictions because they may represent
government's attempt to limit the expression of a particular view-
point. Even "modest" content-based restrictions are, according to
some commentators, difficult to justify because of the distorting in-
fluence they can have on public debate.6 3
Content-neutral restrictions regulate speech with respect to the
appropriate time, place, or manner of expression, and are justifiable
without reference to the content of the message being expressed. In
order to determine content-neutrality, courts must ask whether the
restriction applies "evenhandedly" and impartially to all
viewpoints."
Time, place, and manner restrictions will be upheld if (a) they
are content-neutral, (b) they are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest, and (c) ample alternative means of com-
58. Id. at 242, 721 P.2d at 936.
59. At least not by a majority of the Court. But see Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that
constitutional guarantee of free speech is absolute).
60. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981).
61. For a description and criticism of the content distinction in first amendment analy-
sis, see M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 87-126 (1984). See
also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2, 12-3, at 789-804 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting two categories of governmental restrictions on speech).
62. L. TRIBE, supra note 61.
63. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.,
189, 223 (1983) (noting that even modest content-based restrictions skew public debate).
64. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649.
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munication are available.65 Injunctions (2) through (5) clearly meet
all of these tests. They are content-neutral, reasonable methods of
serving the significant governmental interests in protecting physi-
cians, patients, and staff from unlawful harassment, preventing un-
lawful trespass, and facilitating ingress into and egress from the
building. Since these restrictions do not prohibit SHARE protes-
tors from picketing at the medical facility or anywhere else, the
protestors retain ample opportunities to communicate their anti-
abortion message. Thus, injunctions (2) through (5) do not impose
unconstitutional restrictions on the speech of the anti-abortion
protestors.66
2. Constitutional Validity of the Place Restriction
The Bering court also found restriction (1), which enjoined pick-
eters from protesting on the sidewalk fronting the public entrance to
the medical facility, to be a constitutionally valid, content-neutral
place restriction.67 The court held that the place restriction was (a)
content-neutral, (b) narrowly drawn to serve a significant state in-
terest, and (c) left the SHARE protestors ample alternative means
of expressing their views.68
According to the majority, there are two principal justifications
for the contested place restriction. They are: (a) to permit ingress
and egress to and from the medical facility, and (b) to protect pa-
tients, staff, and visitors from the "heightened coercive impact"
caused by the protestors' close proximity to the main entrance.69
65. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). The Court recently reiterated this
standard in Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789 (1986).
66. Examples of content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions which have been
upheld by the Court include the following: a rule allowing solicitors at a state fair to sell or
distribute merchandise only from a duly-licensed location, Heffron v. International Soc'y. for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1983); a local ordinance forbidding street parades
without a license, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); a local ordinance forbidding
disturbing noises near a school in session, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
and a National Park Service regulation prohibiting protestors from sleeping in the park,
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). All of these regula-
tions seek to restrict the time, place, or manner of speech, but do not single out a particular
message for regulation.
67. 106 Wash. 2d 212, 222-32, 721 P.2d 918, 925-31 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct.
940 (1987).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 223, 721 P.2d at 926. The court cited several Supreme Court cases upholding
speech restrictions designed to facilitate ingress into and egress out of buildings, and to per-
mit traffic to move on sidewalks, including the following: Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611
(1968); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
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However, as the majority concedes, restrictions (2) through (5) ade-
quately serve the first governmental interest in facilitating ingress
and egress.7° If no other governmental interest justifies the place
restriction, the "narrowly tailored' 71 part of the test for validity of
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions requires that
restriction (1) be invalidated, since the other restrictions serve the
governmental interests in traffic flow. Thus, if the injunction is suf-
ficiently narrow to meet constitutional requirements, it must be be-
cause it serves the second governmental interest advanced by the
court.
The court based the governmental interest in protecting pa-
tients, staff and visitors from "heightened coercive impact" on the
constitutional right of privacy, which protects a woman's right to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.72 According to the Ber-
ing court, the privacy right encompasses not only the freedom to
make the decision to terminate a pregnancy, but also the right to be
able to effectuate that decision free from undue harassment.73 The
court stated that the proximity of the picketers to the medical facil-
ity's only public entrance infringed upon the privacy right by
threatening the ability of a woman to effectuate her right to choose:
First, the very presence of anti-abortion picketers directly in
front of the clinic could have such a coercive impact upon a wo-
man that she foregoes the exercise of that right .... Second,
continued harassment of physicians as they enter their lawful
place of business may cause them to refuse to perform legal abor-
tions for women.74
The court supported its position by noting that similar harassment
has allegedly persuaded physicians in twenty-one Washington coun-
ties to stop performing abortions. 75 The court reasoned that not
only might physicians decide to discontinue performing abortions,
but building owners might also be unwilling to lease space to doc-
tors who perform abortions.7 6 If either of these events occurred,
"the coercive presence of the picketers directly in front of the Medi-
cal Building would severely compromise the ability of a woman to
(1940); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
70, 106 Wash. 2d at 225, 721 P.2d at 930.
71. Id at 222, 721 P.2d at 930.
72. Id. at 222, 721 P.2d at 928.
73. 106 Wash. 2d at 227, 721 P.2d at 928 (citing, eg., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-
600 (1977)).
74. 106 Wash. 2d at 228, 721 P.2d at 928.
75. Id at 229, 721 P.2d at 929.
76. Id.
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effectuate the abortion decision, in turn violating the woman's con-
stitutional right of privacy under Roe v. Wade."77
The Supreme Court has held, however, that "[s]peech does not
lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarass
others or coerce them into action."78 In Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe79 the Court invalidated an injunction prohibiting the
Organization for a Better Austin (OBA) from distributing leaflets
critical of Keefe's real estate practice. OBA, an organization whose
purpose was to stabilize the racial mix of Austin, Illinois, objected
to Keefe's "blockbusting" tactics; Keefe allegedly exploited white
homeowners' fears that blacks were moving into the neighborhood
in order to induce them to sell their homes and thereby obtain addi-
tional real estate listings for himself. When Keefe refused to sign an
agreement not to solicit home sales in Austin, OBA began to dis-
tribute leaflets critical of Keefe's tactics. The appellate court en-
joined OBA from distributing the leaflets, apparently viewing the
campaign as "coercive and intimidating, rather than informative."8 0
The Supreme Court invalidated the injunction and held that speech
which is intended to influence the conduct of others is constitution-
ally protected:
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coer-
cive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach
of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influ-
ence respondent's conduct by their activities .... [OBA's leaflet-
ting tactics] are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards
of acceptability.8 1
In other cases, however, the Court has upheld restrictions on
speech intended to influence the conduct of others. In Cox v. Loui-
siana,2 the Court upheld a Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing
near a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice. The Court
held that, because the statute was narrowly drawn, because non-
speech conduct (picketing and patrolling) may be regulated or pro-
77. Id. at 229, 721 P.2d at 929. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
79. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
80. Id. at 418.
81. Id. at 419. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982), in which
the Court reversed a Mississippi decision holding defendants liable for economic damages
caused by a boycott of white businesses launched to protest racial inequalities. The boycott
was supported by speeches, picketing, and by the exertion of social pressure on those who
violated the boycott. The Court held that, despite its intended coercive impact, the nonvio-
lent speech in support of the boycott was protected by the first amendment.
82. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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hibited more easily than "pure" speech, and because of the impor-
tance of the governmental interest in protecting the judicial system
from the pressures of protestors, the statute was not unconstitu-
tional. 83 The Court characterized the interest in fair administration
of justice as essential to a constitutional democracy, and noted the
constitutional safeguards requiring fairness in the criminal process,
including the right to a fair trial: "The constitutional safeguards
relating to the integrity of the criminal process . . . embrace the
fundamental conception of a fair trial, and... exclude influence or
domination by either a hostile or a friendly mob."
' s4
Similarly, the Bering court justified the place restriction as nec-
essary to protect the 'exercise of the constitutionally protected right
to decide to terminate a pregnancy. Contrary to the implication of
the Bering dissent,85 the fact that private individuals, rather than
the state,86 infringed upon the women's privacy right need not di-
minish the state interest in protecting the exercise of that right.
While the constitution does not require states to protect individuals
from interference by others with their constitutional rights, it does
not prohibit them from doing so. State legislatures, and perhaps
state courts, are free to make the policy judgment that a woman's
right to abortion is one deserving of protection from interference by
private individuals.8 7
Cox shows that in some circumstances the state interest in pro-
tecting a constitutional right from private interference may be suffi-
cient to justify a content-neutral place restriction on speech. The
83. Id. at 562.
84. Cox at 562.
85. Id. at 252, 721 P.2d 941 (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting).
86. The Supreme Court cases cited by the majority in support of the significant state
interest in protecting the exercise of a woman's right of privacy, Whalen v. Roe and Roe v.
Wade, involved state interference with the privacy right. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), state statutes made abortion a crime unless necessary to save the life of the pregnant
woman. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), a state statute required disclosure by doctors
of prescriptions of certain drugs which had a high potential for abuse.
87. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), a majority of the Court (which did
not include the author of the Court's Opinion) implied that section five of the 14th amend-
ment empowered Congress to enact laws punishing persons who interfered with the exercise
by others of 14th amendment rights, whether or not they were acting under color of state law.
See Justice Brennan's opinion, id. at 781-82. States, endowed with similar power, have en-
acted legislation prohibiting private individuals from interfering with the rights of others.
See, eg., the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 12, §§ 1 1H, 111 ("Whenever
any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interfere . . . with the
exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights secured by the constitution or
laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the common-
wealth, the attorney general may bring a civil action .... " Id. at 11H).
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Bering court made the policy judgment that a woman's right to
abortion, which is protected by the Constitution, is sufficiently im-
portant to justify place restrictions on the speech of persons at-
tempting to interfere with the exercise of that right. Underlying the
court's judgment was the belief that the abortion right is one pecu-
liarly susceptible to the coercion of others, because of the nature of
the abortion decision.
The essentially private and personal nature-noted in several
Supreme Court opinions-of the decision to obtain an abortion
strengthens the governmental interest in ensuring that a woman can
obtain an abortion free from harassment. In Roe v. Wade, the
Court emphasized the "very personal nature" of the abortion deci-
sion when it held that abortion is protected by the right of pri-
vacy.88 In Belotti v. Baird, Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion
wrote: "It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defi-
ance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third par-
ties."89 Moreover, the Court's invalidation of statutes imposing
consent requirements on abortion also underscores the personal na-
ture of the decision: the abortion decision is a personal one which
should be made by the woman, and no other party should have veto
power over that decision. 90
A woman who has decided to have an abortion rightly expects
that the privacy and confidentiality of that decision will be
respected, and should not have to exercise that decision in a public
setting which requires her to force her way through shouting
protestors. If protection of free speech requires the state to allow
anti-abortion protestors to stand in close proximity to the only pub-
lic entrance to a medical facility, a woman must be forced not only
to hear the protestors' views on the morality of abortion-which
surely constitute protected speech-but must also be subject to the
personal harassment of being called a murderer and baby killer.
Several Supreme Court decisions have recognized an interest
akin to the interest in being free from harassment, and have used
that interest to justify restrictions on speech. In Kovacs v. Cooper,9"
88. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53.
89. 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979).
90. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416;
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747; Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Zbaraz v.
Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
91. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use on public streets
of sound trucks or of any instrument attached to a vehicle, emitting
"loud and raucous" noises.92 This speech restriction was justified
by the "duty [of the state] within constitutional limitations, to pro-
tect the well-being and tranquility of a community." 93
The Court has also recognized that the special characteristics of
a place may justify additional restrictions on speech. In cases in-
volving labor disputes at hospitals, the Court has upheld restrictions
on organizational speech because of the special nature of hospitals
and the interests of patients. 94
The Court has also found that schools possess special character-
istics which may justify additional restrictions on speech. In
Grayned v. City of Rockford9" the Court upheld the conviction,
under an anti-noise ordinance, of a protestor who picketed near a
school while the school was in session. The Court noted that "[tihe
nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations of time, place and manner that are reason-
able.' "96 The Court also stated that "expressive activity may be
restricted, but only if the forbidden conduct 'materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others.' "9 According to the reasoning of the above cases, a
medical facility like the one in Bering ought to be able to maintain a
certain degree of quiet and tranquility and should not be forced to
permit shouting protestors to picket in close proximity to the only
public entrance. These cases also suggest that governmental restric-
tions on the place and manner of speech aimed at reaching this goal
are permissible.
The interest in freedom from harassment reflects the Court's
special solicitude for peace and tranquility in the home. In Breard
v. Alexandria,9" the Court upheld a "Green River ordinance,"
which, as applied, prohibited door-to-door solicitation of magazine
subscriptions. The Court held that door-to-door solicitors could
not use the first amendment's protection to override a homeowner's
92. Id.
93. I at 83 (emphasis supplied).
94. See NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773 (1981).
95. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
96. IL at 116 (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1042 (1969)).
97. Id. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
98. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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interest in privacy and repose.99 Although the Court has invali-
dated other ordinances restricting door-to-door soliciting,1" the
Court has on several occasions stressed that an individual's interest
in being left alone is greatest in the home, "the last citadel of the
tired, the weary, and the sick."101
Another type of speech which might be subject to special restric-
tions in order to protect the interest in freedom from harassment is
residential picketing. Although in Carey v. Brown 102 the Court in-
validated, on equal protection grounds, an ordinance which gener-
ally prohibited residential picketing, but discriminated in favor of a
particular kind of speech (labor speech), the Court left open the
question whether a ban on residential picketing which did not dis-
criminate on the basis of subject matter would violate the first
amendment. In Carey the Court emphasized that its opinion should
not "be understood to imply.., that residential picketing is beyond
the reach of uniform and nondiscriminatory regulation."' 03 In Gar-
cia v. Gray"° the Tenth Circuit upheld, as applied, an ordinance
prohibiting residential picketing. Testimony in that case indicated
that the picketing, by city employees at the home of the mayor and
other city officials, "created disturbance, noise and an aura of har-
99. Id. at 645. The Breard court emphasized that its decision was protecting homeown-
ers from annoyance by opportunists for private gain.
100. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987), aff'g
mem., 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicit-
ing prior to 9 a.m. and after 5 p.m. Monday through Saturday); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating ordinance, under which a Jehovah's Witness was convicted,
which prohibited any person from ringing doorbells for the purpose of distributing handbills).
101. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). See FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcast media has more limited first
amendment protection than other media, in part because it may intrude into the "privacy of
the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amend-
ment rights of an intruder"); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding
statute allowing addressees to remove their names from mailing lists for erotic materials).
102. 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating under the equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment a statute prohibiting picketing of residences or dwellings except where a dwelling
is a place of employment involved in a labor dispute). See also Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating city ordinance which prohibited picketing within
150 feet of school as violative of 14th amendment equal protection clause because an imper-
missible distinction between labor and other speech was made by ordinance). Lower court
decisions have sometimes upheld, sometimes invalidated, bans on residential picketing. In
the labor context, courts have been more willing than in other areas to uphold residential
bans. See Arnolds & Seng, Picketing and Privacy: Can I Patrol on the Street Where You
Live?, 1982 ILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1982); Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amend-
ment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177 (1967).
103. 447 U.S. at 470-71.
104. 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
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assment and fear."10' 5 Garcia is at odds with other Circuit Court
decisions invalidating ordinances prohibiting residential picket-
ing.106 The Supreme Court will hear one of these conflicting
cases-Frisby v. Schulz 107-- this term. The Court's decision in that
case should shed some light on the degree of protection accorded to
the general interest in freedom from harassment, and also on the
particular interest in freedom from harassment in the privacy of
one's home.
Of course, the anti-abortion protestors at issue in Bering were
picketing on a public sidewalk, not in front of women's homes.
However, it is the privacy of the home and the interest in tranquility
which is emphasized in cases such as Breard and Garcia. The na-
ture of the abortion decision and the psychological state of a woman
about to have an abortion suggest that the state may legitimately
decide that a woman about to enter an abortion clinic is entitled to a
greater degree of privacy and tranquility than is usually accorded in
public places. 10 8
As the above cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has been will-
ing to uphold content-neutral, narrowly tailored time, place and
manner restrictions in order to protect the interest in being free
from excessive noise, and to protect the interests in maintaining
some degree of quiet and tranquility in hospitals, schools, and in
one's home. If this interest in freedom from harassment is one
which justifies time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, the
Bering place restriction is not unconstitutional. The essentially per-
sonal and private nature of the abortion decision justifies a place
restriction which, by restricting the proximity of protestors to the
only public entrance to the medical building, seeks to limit the ex-
tent to which anti-abortion protestors are able to harass women
who have chosen to obtain an abortion.
105. id at 542.
106. See Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1987), in which the court
invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad an ordinance which proscribed picketing of a
residential or dwelling place. The court recognized the significant governmental interest in
peace and privacy of the home, but found the ordinance insufficiently narrowly tailored be-
cause, for example, it prohibited picketing in partially commercial areas as well as in purely
residential areas.
107. Schulz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting
residential picketing and upholding lower court's injunction against enforcement), aff'd, 822
F.2d 642 (1987), prob. jurim noted, 108 S. Ct. 692 (1988).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 98 & 104.
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3. Constitutionality of Restriction on the Use of the Words
"Kill, " "Murder, " and Derivatives
The Bering court analyzed part (6) of the injunction, which pro-
hibits protestors from using the words "kill" or "murder" or their
derivatives in the presence of children, as a content-based speech
restriction." 9 The words "kill" and "murder," used in reference to
doctors at the medical building, express SHARE's view that abor-
tion is morally wrong and that human life should be protected at
conception. By prohibiting these words, the injunction arguably
singles out a particular message for regulation.
(a) The High Value/Low Value Speech Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis.
Some content-based speech restrictions will be permitted with a
showing of less than a compelling governmental interest. Since
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"0 the Court has used a two-tiered
approach to content-based speech restrictions. Dictum in that case
outlined two separate classes of speech. The first class, "low value"
speech, is not entitled to first amendment protection.111 Low value
speech is not protected because "such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of... slight social value as a
step to truth."' 12 Speech in this class has traditionally included
"the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'fighting' words.""' 3 According to the Chaplinsky Court, crimi-
nal punishment for low value speech "would raise no question
under [the Constitution].""I 4 All speech which is not "low value" is
protected by the first amendment; any content-based restrictions on
"high value" speech must meet the highest standard of review." 5
109. See supra text accompanying note 52.
110. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
111. Id. at 571-72.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 572. Some commentators argue that this two-tiered approach to speech has
declined in the Court in recent years, and that the only remaining category of speech which is
wholly unprotected is obscene speech. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
114. 315 U.S. at 572.
115. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (content-based speech restric-
tions "will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental inter-
est"); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) ("A restriction
that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech may be imposed so long as it is
reasonable. But when regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must
be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited merely
because public officials disapprove the speaker's views."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
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This "two-level" approach to first amendment analysis has been ex-
tensively analyzed and criticized by legal scholars and Supreme
Court Justices alike. 116 In recent years some members of the Court
have moved from the two-tiered Chaplinsky system to one which
provides some, but less than complete, first amendment protection
to several intermediate categories of speech.' 1 7 These categories in-
clude, among others, sexual speech which is not obscene,11 8 and of-
fensive speech which is not obscene.119
(b) "'Kill" and 'Murder". Low Value Speech?
The Bering court relied on two Supreme Court decisions ad-
dressing the constitutionality of restrictions on unprotected and
"low value" speech, Ginsberg v. New York 120 and FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,121 to hold that the content-based speech restriction
prohibiting protestors from using the words "kill," "murder," or
their derivatives in the presence of children did not violate the first
amendment. 122
The court held that there was a compelling governmental inter-
est in preventing children from hearing the words "kill" and "mur-
der" used in connection with their doctors. The court also adopted
the trial court's finding that the prohibited words had "inflicted
trauma upon the children overhearing such references and ... by
their very utterance ... harmed the doctor-patient relationship es-
sential to the effective delivery of health care." 123 The Bering court
held that this compelling governmental interest was sufficient to
proscribe, consistent with the first amendment, the words "kill" and
"murder." 12 4
92, 95 (1972) ("Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
116. See, eg., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, supra note 113.
117. See L. TRIBE, supra note 61, % 12-18, at 930.
118. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (upholding zoning regu-
lation of adult theatres; films not held obscene); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning regulation of adult theatres); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding ordinance prohibiting sale of sexually oriented materials to chil-
dren under age 16).
119. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC sanction of offensive
speech).
120. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
121. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
122. 106 Wash. 2d 212, 237-41, 721 P.2d 918, 933-35 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct.
940 (1987).
123. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d at 933 (quoting from the trial court opinion).
124. Id. at 241, 721 P.2d at 935.
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The Bering court relies too heavily, however, upon Ginsberg and
Pacifica. Those cases did not allow the speech restrictions to stand
because there was a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to
overcome the strong presumption of unconstitutionality of content-
based restrictions on "high value" speech. Rather, Ginsberg in-
volved low-value speech which was obscene only as to minors;1 5
Pacifica involved "offensive" speech, which, according to some
members of the Court, also deserves less than full first amendment
protection. 126
(c) Ginsberg v. New York.
In Ginsberg, the Court upheld appellant's conviction under a
New York law prohibiting the sale of magazines containing nude
pictures to children under seventeen years old.'27 The Court explic-
itly stated that the magazines would not be obscene for adults, but
rejected a claim that the New York legislature's variable definition
of obscenity, which imposed a different standard for minors, vio-
lated minors' constitutional rights."8 The Ginsberg majority opin-
ion held that it was rational for the New York legislature to decide
that the speech at issue in that case was, with respect to minors,
obscene, and so unprotected: "obscenity is not protected expression
and may be suppressed without a showing of the circumstances
which lie behind the phrase 'clear and present danger' in its applica-
tion to protected speech."' 129
The Court reasoned that legislators have the power to adopt a
different standard of obscenity for minors because "the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of
its authority over adults."' 3 ° The Court pointed to the primary role
of parents in rearing children and concluded that the legislature
could properly leave to parents the decision whether or not their
children ought to view nude photographs. 3'
States, as well as parents, have legitimate, independent interests
in " 'protect[ing] the welfare of children,' " according to the Court,
"and [in ensuring] that they are 'safeguarded from abuses' which
might prevent their 'growth into free and independent well-devel-
125. 390 U.S. 629, 629.
126. 438 U.S. 726, 729-31.
127. 390 U.S. at 636-37.
128. Id. at 634, 638.
129. Id. at 641-42.
130. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
131. Id. at 639.
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oped men and citizens.' ""2 The Court found that the sale of the
magazine to the youth constituted such an abuse, and upheld Gins-
berg's conviction.
133
The Bering court quoted much of the Ginsberg opinion to sup-
port its view that protecting children from hearing the words "kill"
and "murder" used in reference to their doctors is a compelling
governmental interest. The 6ourt argued that parents should be
able to decide whether and when to explain abortion to their chil-
dren, and analogized the harm resulting from hearing the pro-
scribed words in this case to the harm of viewing the nude pictures
in Ginsberg.134 The Bering court thought the content-based restric-
tion justified by the state's "interest in preventing the 'abuse' suf-
fered by young children hearing the proscribed words just before
they visit their doctors."' 35
Ginsberg does reaffirm the principles that the state's power to
control the conduct of children is greater than its authority over
adults, and that the state has legitimate and independent interests in
protecting the welfare of children. The reasoning of the Ginsberg
Court, with its emphasis on protecting minors from abuse, readily
applies to the Bering fact pattern, where the court had legitimate
worries about the detrimental impact the proscribed words would
have on young children. However, the Bering court's reliance on a
decision sanctioning the restriction of obscene speech in justifying
restrictions on the use of the words "kill" and "murder" in the con-
text of abortion reflects a balance in which the first amendment in-
terests are given too little weight.
136
The Ginsberg Court explicitly sanctioned New York's adjust-
ment of the obscenity standard as applied to minors and accepted
the state's judgment that the magazines were obscene with respect
132. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165).
133. Id. at 641.
134. 106 Wash. 2d at 239, 721 P.2d at 934.
135. Id.
136. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court formulated the following
definition of obscenity: "Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner ap-
pealing to [the] prurient interest... [of] the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards. ... Id. at 487, 489. The Court modified this definition in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In determining whether material is obscene, the trier of fact
must ask:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. The words "kill" and "murder" clearly do not fit this definition of obscenity.
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to children.137 Since obscenity is unprotected speech, the Court's
decision that the magazines were obscene as to children in the con-
text of that case disposed of the first amendment problem. The
Ginsberg Court did not depart from the principle that regulation of
speech which does not fall within one of the unprotected categories
must meet a very stringent standard of review. The Court implic-
itly balanced the potential harm to the children who saw the
magazines against the harm to the first amendment interests, and
found that the first amendment interests were outweighed. In a
case such as Bering the potential harm to children of hearing the
proscribed words may be equally great, but the SHARE protestors'
political message should not be subject to the kind of balancing pro-
cess applied to the contextually obscene speech in Ginsberg. While
the Bering court properly considered the reasoning in Ginsberg ap-
plicable to the facts of Bering, extension of the holding to that deci-
sion would more seriously endanger first amendment interests.
(d) FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.
Pacifica involved "offensive" speech. In Pacifica the Supreme
Court reviewed an order issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to a radio station owned by Pacifica Founda-
tion.a38 The radio station had broadcast comedian George Carlin's
monologue "Filthy Words," a recording of a live performance in
which Carlin repeated a number of profane words which he con-
tended could not be said on the public airwaves. "Filthy Words"
was broadcast in the early afternoon. 139 A father, who heard the
recording while driving in the car with his young son, wrote a letter
to the FCC complaining about the broadcast. 1" The FCC granted
the complaint and held that the " 'language as broadcast was inde-
cent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464.' "141 The FCC did not
impose formal sanctions on Pacifica Foundation, but instead put a
note in the radio station's file and indicated that in the future it
might sanction radio stations that broadcast similar programs in the
afternoon when it was likely that children would be listening. The
order was challenged on first amendment and statutory grounds. 142
137. 390 U.S. at 640-41.
138. 438 U.S. 726, 731.
139. Id. at 729-30.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 725.
142. Id. at 727, 729-31. The statutory issues were (1) whether the FCC's action was
"censorship" prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 326, and (2) whether non-obscene indecent speech
could be restricted under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids radio broadcasts of "any
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The Supreme Court upheld the FCC order.'43 The Court held
that the FCC has constitutional and statutory power to regulate
speech which is not obscene. In that part of the opinion in which
five Justices joined,'" the Court emphasized the narrowness of the
holding and its dependence upon the particular context of the after-
noon radio broadcast. 145 Because the Pacifica decision sanctions re-
strictions on non-obscene speech, it appears to afford better support
for the Bering injunction than Ginsberg.
The Bering court in particular relied on Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion, in which Justice Powell stressed the "shock" value of
continually repeating the profane words, and the consequent harm-
ful impact on children. 146 The Bering court similarly thought that
children would suffer from the "shock" of hearing their doctors
called "killers" and "murderers" just before a medical visit.147
Justice Powell's opinion does not, however, provide adequate
support for the Bering speech restriction. Justice Powell, who dis-
agreed with Justice Stevens' high-value/low-value approach to first
amendment analysis in Pacifica,'48 suggested that Carlin's record-
ing could be restricted in this very limited context (that is, when
children were likely to be listening) because of the manner (he
called it "verbal shock") of expression. 49 He agreed with the FCC
view that most listeners would find Carlin's monologue "vulgar and
offensive" or "'patently offensive.' "150
Justice Powell also emphasized the intrusive quality of a radio
broadcast, arguing that the home is one place where people usually
may be free from unwanted communication.'' Justice Powell, who
stated in Pacifica that "the First Amendment may require unwilling
adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech
obscene, indecent, or profane language." Id. at 731, 735. The Court concluded that § 326
did not proscribe the FCC's action, and that non-obscene, indecent speech could be re-
stricted under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Id. at 738.
143. Id. at 750-51.
144. Justices Burger and Rehnquist joined in all parts of Stevens' opinion. Justices
Blackmun and Powell joined in all parts except IV-A and IV-B (in which Justice Stevens
placed Carlin's speech into the "low-value" category), and Justice Powell filed a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall joined. Id. at 728.
145. Id. at 750-51.
146. Id. at 757-58 (Powell, J., concurring).
147. 106 Wash. 2d at 240-41, 721 P.2d at 934-35.
148. 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 759-60 (Powell, J., concurring).
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when they are in public,"1 2 would accord more protection to
speech in a public forum like a street or sidewalk 15 3 than to speech
in the home. As the Bering court noted, children visiting the medi-
cal building cannot avoid the impact of the protestors simply by
averting their eyes or closing their ears; the protestors' words will
reach the children when they walk through the picket line in order
to reach their doctor. However, unlike the case of the woman seek-
ing to implement her decision to have an abortion whose privacy
interests do not weaken between her home and the medical facil-
ity, 54 the privacy interests of the children in being free from un-
wanted and offensive communication may be weaker on a public
sidewalk than in their own homes. If so, SHARE's speech should
be granted more protection than the Pacifica radio broadcast, which
could have intruded into the home. Moreover, the other injunc-
tions imposed on the anti-abortion protestors, including the con-
tested place restriction, minimize the effect that the hearing of those
words can have on children. 5 ' Because of the special discomfort
associated with face-to-face confrontations and the fear engendered
by close proximity to angry, vocal, protestors, children are much
less likely to be traumatized by hearing protestors shout "killer"
and "murderer" on the next street than they would be by protestors
shouting those words in their ears just before they enter the medical
building.
The Bering court also disregarded Justice Stevens' opinion in
Pacifica. Justice Stevens quite clearly based his opinion, in which
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined, on the "low
value" of Carlin's speech.1 56 Stevens was not concerned by the pos-
sibility that the FCC's order might lead to self-censorship on the
part of some broadcasters. He thought the order's definition of in-
decency would "deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive
references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." 157 This
152. Id. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. Id. Speech in public forums, especially streets and parks, has traditionally been ac-
corded more first amendment protection than speech in non-public forums. See Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 517-18 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."). See also Stone, Fora Ameri-
cana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 236-45 (discussing development of
the public forum theory).
154. See supra section III.B.2.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 52.
156. 438 U.S. at 746.
157. Id. at 743.
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kind of speech, according to Stevens, "surely [lies] at the periphery
of First Amendment concern." 15
8
In contrast, the words "kill" and "murder," especially in the
context of the abortion debate, cannot be considered "low value."
They are neither obscene nor offensive in the constitutional sense,
though their expression may certainly offend some hearers. For
SHARE picketers, the words are very clearly an "essential part of
[the] exposition of ideas." '159 As such, they qualify for the strict
protection accorded to "high value" speech.
(e) "High Value" of the Words "Kill" and "'Murder."
The words used by the SHARE picketers and prohibited by re-
striction (6) are a central part of the debate on the abortion issue.
The anti-abortion activists and their supporters believe that the em-
bryo is a person, and that abortion is murder; this belief is the moral
foundation of the anti-abortion position. The Supreme Court has
stated that "[p]ublic-issue picketing, 'an exercise of... basic consti-
tutional rights in their most pristine and classic form,' has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values." 1 60 The words "kill" and "murder," when used by anti-
abortion protestors, seem to rest squarely on the highest rung of
first amendment values.
One can argue that the words "kill" and "murder" are simply
particular vehicles used to express the protestors' belief that abor-
tion is morally wrong, and that proscription of the use of those
words is not a content-based restriction at all, but is simply a restric-
tion on the manner of speech. The Bering injunction does not pre-
vent the protestors from expressing their views through other
words, for example, "Abortion results in the death of a human be-
ing." If the injunction restricts only the manner, and not the con-
tent of the protestors' speech, it should be subject to a lower
standard of review. In this case, however, the words are chosen for
their emotive impact; other words probably could not adequately
convey the depth of the beliefs of the anti-abortion protestors.
Choosing words for their impact is protected by the first
amendment.
In Cohen v. California"'6 the Supreme Court reversed Paul Co-
hen's conviction under a disturbing-the-peace statute. Cohen had
158. Id.
159. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
160. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
161. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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worn a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" inscribed on the
back into a Los Angeles courtroom. Justice Harlan, writing for the
majority, recognized that "words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force," and argued that the emotive force
may often be the "more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated." 162  Although Cohen could have ex-
pressed his view by inscribing the following message on his jacket:
"The draft is wrong, and Americans have a moral right to disregard
it," this would not have communicated his political views as force-
fully. Similarly, referring to doctors who perform abortions as
"killers" and "murderers" forcefully communicates SHARE's be-
lief that abortion is morally wrong. It is difficult to imagine words
which could effectively replace "kill" and "murder" in expressing
the anti-abortion movement's highly emotional message.
(f) Words Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire the Court stated that there are
some classes of speech, including "those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace," which do not deserve any first amendment protection.1 63
The Supreme Court cases which have analyzed first amendment
questions under this part of the Chaplinsky doctrine have focused
on "fighting words" which tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. It can be argued that "kill" and "murder" are "fighting
words" when they are used to describe persons entering and leaving
a medical center where abortions are performed; they are, arguably,
insulting epithets addressed to specific persons likely to be provoked
to immediate violence. 1" However, the Court has construed the
"fighting words" exception to protected speech very narrowly, and
has not upheld a conviction for uttering "fighting words" since
Chaplinsky.165
The Court has not foreclosed the possibility of restricting speech
which by its very utterance inflicts injury. "Kill" and "murder,"
162. Id. at 26.
163. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
164. See Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107
S. Ct. 940 (1987). See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 518, 523 (1972); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. at 20.
165. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (statute making speech which
tends to cause a breach of peace a misdemeanor held unconstitutionally vague under first and
14th amendments); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (conviction of "casting con-
tempt" on American flag through speech overturned as violative of freedom of expression); L.
TRIBE, supra note 61, § 12-10, at 850-56.
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when used in reference to doctors and women at abortion clinics,
may well be words which cause injury simply by virtue of their be-
ing uttered and heard.1 6 A woman about to have an abortion is
quite likely to be distressed by being called a "murderess"; indeed,
some claim that complication rates for the abortion procedure in-
crease when picketers are protesting outside the clinic. 167 The Ber-
ing court found that these words caused injury to children about to
visit their doctors. Moreover, the words "kill" and "murder," in
these circumstances arguably do not serve the values underlying the
first amendment; they are not likely to invite more speech, and
probably will not be countered by more speech. If the Constitution
allows restrictions on injurious words, perhaps the words at issue in
Bering should be restricted.
However, while there may be a compelling governmental inter-
est in minimizing the harm caused by the words "kill" and "mur-
der," there are less restrictive means to further this interest. The
place restriction and other injunctions in Bering limit the proximity
of the protestors to the public entrance and the persons most likely
to be injured by the words, 168 and also impose restrictions on the
manner of protest. These measures will minimize the harm caused
by the words "kill" and "murder." The protestors' free speech
rights should not be infringed by proscribing the use of these words
at the picket site when young children are present.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the content-based restriction in Ber-
ing unconstitutionally restricts the free speech rights of SHARE
protestors. This conclusion, if correct, may be troubling because it
limits the means by which women can be protected from intimida-
tion by anti-abortion protestors. While anti-abortion activists
clearly have the right to attempt to persuade women that abortion is
wrong, the presence of shouting anti-abortion picketers at an abor-
tion clinic has a much more coercive impact on women seeking
abortion than other forms of persuasion. But a court should not
adopt content-based restrictions in order to protect a woman's in-
terest in deciding to terminate a pregnancy free from harassment;
166. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 12-10, at 856: "The Constitution may well allow punish-
ment for speaking words that cause hurt just by their being uttered and heard .... The first
amendment need not sanctify the deliberate infliction of pain simply because the vehicle used
is verbal or symbolic rather than physical."
167. See supra note 38.
168. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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imposition of the content-neutral time, place, and manner restric-
tions embodied in restrictions (1) through (5) of the Bering injunc-
tion, if effectively enforced,1 69 probably would have substantially
reduced the coercive impact of the anti-abortion picketers.
Moreover, vigorous prosecution of trespassers, vandals, and vio-
lent protestors would help ensure the availability of abortion facili-
ties. Some states have recently passed laws imposing stricter
punishments on anti-abortion protestors who vandalize, burn, or
bomb abortion facilities, and others have passed "Anti-Harass-
ment" acts,' 7 ° declaring the state's intention to punish those who
unlawfully interfere with a woman's right to choose. These kinds of
measures are preferable to those which, by limiting the terms of the
abortion debate or singling out a particular viewpoint for regula-
tion, restrict the freedom of expression.
BONNY E. SWEENEY
169. Id.
170. See supra note 31.
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